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Introduction
On 26February1996,Morocco andthe EuropeanUnion (hereaftereferredto astheEU) signedanAssociationAgreement.This associationformspartof theEuro-
MediterraneanPartnership,whichwasestablishedatBarcelonaon 27-28November1995,
atameetingbetweenthe EU and the majority of the non-European Mediterranean
countries.It is known in Euro-speakasthe 'BarcelonaProcess'.The agreement,which
cameintoeffecton 1 March 2000,shouldleadto the creationof a fTee-tradeareaby the
year2010.Thiswill giveMoroccofTeeaccesstoEU markets,atleastasfarasindustrial
produetsareconcerned.The agreementalsoairnsto achievethe progressiveliberaliza-
rionoftradein agriculturalandfisheryproducts,but without anyfirm commitrnentby
thepartiesconcerned.It alsorequiresMorocco andthe EU to explorewaysofliberali-
zingtradein services,aboveandbeyondtheirWTO (WorldTradeOrganization)obli-
gations.
Whatbenefitscan Morocco expectfTom this association?In order to answerthis
question,wewill startwith somebackgroundinformationon internationaltradetheo-
ry,withanapplicationto Morocco's tradingsituation.We will then proceedto discuss
theprocessof tradeliberalization.This, in turn,is followedby ananalysisof theproblerns
associatedwithMorocco'seconomicintegrationwith othercountries.The nextsection
dealswiththecostsandbenefitsderivingfTomtheAssociation,and&om ahigherdegree
ofintegrationi theworld economyin general.From herewe moveon to examinethe
preconditionsthatmustbe fulfilled if this integrationis to be successful.The final secti-
ondrawsconclusionson thebasisof the discussionsandempiricaldatacontainedin the
precedingsections.
Internationaltrade
Thepositiveeffectsof internationaltrade can be said to derive fTom three sources.
Firstly,specializationdictatedby comparativeadvantage.If countries,like individuals,
specializen thoseactivitiesatwhich they excel,or aremost efficient,then production
andincomewill bemaxirnized.This is explainedby the Ricardo andHeckscher-Ohlin
models,which form the core of internationaltradetheory.l Secondly,economiesof
scale.Freetradeprovidesopportunitiesfor large-scaleproduction,aswell asthe chance
toexploitheeconomiesof large-scaleproduction,i.e., to reducethe productionand
marketingcastsperproductunit.Thirdly, competitioneffects.When bordersareopen-
1See,for instanee,Krugman and Obstfeld (2006) 26, 50, 76.
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ed, competition increases.This meansthat firms will haveto constantlyimprovethe
goodsandservicestheyproduce,to preventtheir customersfrom shilling their allegian-
ce.The sameappliesto thesecompanies'productiontechnologyandmarketingmethocls.
In view of thesebenefits,why is thereno freetradeon a globalscale?There arebasi-
callythreereasonsfor this.Firstly,tradeaffectsthe distributionof income.If we liberali-
ze tradeandimport moregoodsproducedusingunskilledlabour,while atthesametime
exportingmore goodsproducedwith highly skilledlabour,thiswill haveseveraleffects.
The demandfor poorly-skilledlabourfalls,the demandfor highly-skilledlabour incre-
ases,andthe wagegapbetweenthe two will widen.This maythenresultin attemptsby
tradeunions to preventtradeliberalization.
Secondly,when a country liberalizestrade,industriescompetingwith the imported
goodswill suffer.This will causesomefirrnsandindustriesto contract,while othersmay
evendisappearcompletely.Peoplewill haveto beretrained.There rnaybeananxietythat
newjobs arenot being createdfastenoughto compensatefor the disappearanceof the
old ones.Again, thoseaffectedwill resistliberalization.A very curiouscaseof resistance
againstfreerimports occurredin the mid-1990s,when tomatoesfrom Morocco were
grantedfreerentryinto theEU. Fully awarethatthiswould impingeon theirprofitmar-
gins,tomatogrowersin the EU conducteda successfullobbyingcampaignin Brussels.
It was subsequentlyruled that, in the month of April, the door would be closedto
Moroccan tomatoes2.The reasonfor thiswasthat,inApril, EU tomatoproductionislow
andpricesarehigh.The banon Moroccan tomatoesenabledEU tomatogrowersto flee-
ce the consumerin timesof scarcity.
Thirdly, traderestrictionsin the form of import tarifISalsoservean entirelydifferent
purpose,the generationof tax revenue.The perceptioncostsof import tariffsarelikely
to be substantiallylower thanthoseassociatedwith income tax or a turnovertax.Paar
countriesin particular,including Morocco in the early1980s,often derivesomethirty
per centof their totaltax income from import tarifIS.3
There is no questionthatinternationaltradeis essentialto Morocco'swelfare.It hasa
comparativeadvantagein phosphates,a numberof agriculturalproducts,andthesimpIer
kinds of industrial processes,such as garmentmanufactureand electronicsassembly.
Morocco's export revenuederivesrnain1yfrom theseproductsand activities(seeTable
1).It is betterto specializein theseareasandimport thoseindustrialproductsthatrequi-
re highly skilledlabour and a large amount of capitaland/or are dependenton high
volumesfor efficientproduction.A casein pointis truckassembly.In theyear2000,
sometwo thousandtruckswereassembIedin Morocco by no lessthannine producers.
This is a wasteof resources.4
It servesasa reminderthatMorocco is a relativelysmallmarket.In 2003,Morocco
had 30.6 million inhabitantsand its grossdomesticproduct or GDP amountedto €39
billion (bn).By comparison,the Netherlandshad16.2million inhabitantsanda GDP of
2 Trouw(1995).
3 Ebrill, StotskyandGropp (1999).
4WTO (2003)85.
$454bn. For mostindustries,the domesticmarketis simplytoo smallfor them to be
ableto exploiteconomiesof scale.Tradeliberalizationis of the essence.Productswhich
areexpensiveto producein Morocco shouldbe imported.This will treeup production
factorsthatcanbe usedto betteradvantagein the exportindustries.
Tahle1.Morocco,percentageshareofcommodityexports,1995and2002
textiles
agriculture
electronics
fertilizer(phosphates)
SOUTee:Söderling (2005).
TheEU is the country'snaturalpartnerwhen it comesto internationaltrade.In 2003,
theEU accountedfor no lessthan71% of Morocco's exportsand 58%of its imports.5
lt is a sadfact that the EU hasnot allowedMorocco to fully exploit its comparative
advantage.Under the AssociationAgreement,industrial imports trom Morocco have
unrestrictedentry into the EU, but therehasbeenlittle progresson tradein agricultu-
ralgoods.The tradeagreementof October 2003 imposedtariff quotason a numberof
products,suchastomatoes.This meansthat imports carry a low tariff,possiblyevena
zerotariff,up to a certainvolume.Additional importsaresubjectto a higher tariff.
Suchagreementsareonly concludedfor shortperiods.This uncertaintydoeslittle to
stimulateinvestment.A fisheriesagreement,for example,which wasdue to takeeffect
on1 March 2006,is only valid for a period of four years.The agreementregulatesthe
activitiesof EU fishingfleets- mainlySpanishandPortuguese- in Moroccan waters.It
containsdetailedstipulationsregardingthe percentageof the catchthathasto be unlo-
adedon Moroccan soil.This wasin responseto Moroccan demands,which wereaimed
atboostingemploymentand tax income. In addition,it was hoped that the measure
wouldstimulatethedevelopmentoflocal fishprocessingindustries.6However,it remains
tobeseenwhetheror not peoplewill be willing to makesubstantialinvestmentson the
basisof anagreementwith a lifetimeofjust four years.As for services,prior to 2005the
EU hadnot evenstartedto think seriouslyaboutdiscussingthe subject.
5EuropeanCornrnission(2005).Tradestatisticshouldbetakenwith a grainof salt.Exportsof
goodsfiom Morocco officiallytotalled€8230million over2003,EuropeanCornrnission(2005),
butillegaldrugsexportsareestimatedto havebroughtin no lessthan€3 billion,Bergh (2005)9.
6L'économiste(17July 2005,23 December2005).
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1tadeliberalization
The import of Moroccan industrialproductsinto the EU had alreadybeen liberalized
beforethe 2000AssociationAgreementwasconcluded.So one might weIl ask'What is
in it for Morocco?'Mter all,Morocco will bearthebrunt of the necessaryadjustments.
It is under an obligationto liberalizeits imports,especiallythoseinvolving industrial
products.Nevertheless,countriesgenerallybenefitconsiderablyfiom import liberaliza-
tion. In the past,Morocco hasusedquite high ratesof protection.According to 2002
figuresfiom theWorld Bank, the weightedmeanimport tariff in Morocco was25.8%,
against1.80%for the EU. If anything,this still paintsa too favourablepicture.7Some
goods are subject to prohibitively high tariffs.The maximum rate was a whopping
339%.8As aresult,the goodsthat fall under this tariff scarcelyfigure amongthe coun-
try'simports.This meansthat they arenot included in the weightedaverage,which is
thereforesubjectto a downwardbias.Such high levelsof protectionaredetrimentalto
a country'swelfare.They enableinefficientindustriesto survive.This in its turn makes
life harderfor industriesoperatingin thoseareasin which a country hasa comparative
advantage.
Three mechanismsareinvolved.The first derivesfiom the factthatprotectionresults
in reduceddemandfor foreigngoods,which in turn causesa reductionin the demand
for foreignexchange.Accordingly,the externalvalueof the country'scurrencywill be
higher thanit would havebeen under fiee tradeconditions,which meansthatexports
suffer.Secondly,more labourand capitalremaintied up in the protectedsectors,which
translatesinto higher labour and capitalcostsin the other sectors.Thirdly, potential
exportersseetheir competitivenessimpairedby the higher cost(or sheerunavailability)
of importedinputs.In the caseof Morocco, agriculturalexportershavesufferedfiom the
high prices of such imports as tractorsand seeds,which are a direct resultof import
duties.As a result,a largenumber of industrieshaveseentheir growth reducedby the
unavailabilityof inputs.9
In Morocco, thingsaremadeevenmore complicatedby the enormousvariationin
import tariffs.This leads to a completely opaque structure of effectiveprotection.
Effectiveprotectiondiffersfiom nominalprotection (import tariffson goods),in thatit
refersto theprotectionof domesticactivities,takingaccountof tariffi on importedraw
materialsor semi-finishedproducts.Consider the caseof carpentersinvolved in the
manufactureof tables.The amountof timberrequiredto makeone tablecosts$100on
world markets,whereascompletetablescost$200on world markets.If timberis subject
to a 5% import tariff and completetablesarecharged10%,then the domesticprice of
the importedtimberis $105andthe domesticprice of an importedtableis $220.The
work oftransformingthe timberinto a tablecan costup to $115beforedomesticcar-
penters lose the fight againstimports.This meansthat the effectiveprotectionon
domesticactivityis 15%,which is higher than the nominal tariff on tables.However,if
7 EconomieR viewofEU MediterraneanP rtners(2003)7.
8WTO (2003)Statistica!AppendixTableAIII.3.
9 Bergh (2005)8.
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timberissubjecto a15%tariff,for example,while tablesonly carrya 5%tariff,theresult
isnegativeffectiveprotection.Imported timberwill cost$115,while importedtables
cast$210.Domesticcarpenterswill thereforebe handicapped,sincethey canchargeno
morethan$95,which is $5 lessthantheir colleaguesabroadreceive.
Itmayverywell be thatactivitiesin areaswhere Morocco enjoysa comparativeadvan-
tagecannotprosperbecauseof adverseeffectiveprotection.According to theWTO and
theIMF (InternationalMonetary Fund), the existingtariff stmcturestacksthe odds
againstindustriesproducingsemi-finishedproducts,in which Morocco is saidto havea
comparativeadvantage10.However,it mightbe more accurateto saythatMorocco hasa
comparativeadvantagein the areaof re1ative1ysimpleindustrialprocesses.In the textile
industry,for instance,there is considerableoutsourcing and/or intra-firm trade by
SpanishandBritish firms.This meansthattherearesubstantialimports of intermediate
goodstrom SpainandBritain, and thatthe finishedgoodsare exportedto thesesame
cauntries.The exportof finishedtextileproductsto theUK andSpainincreased18-fold
and26-foldrespective1y,in nominal terms,between1995and2002.11
Moroccowill undoubtedlybenefittrom thephasingout of import tariffson industri-
algoods.However,the sequencingof thisprocesswill involveadversesideeffects.This
isbecausethetariffsfor finalproducts- an areain which Morocco hasno comparative
advantage,at leastnot for sophisticatedgoods-, will be the lastto go.As a result,these
produetswill continueto receiveprotectionwhile othersdo not, which will givefalse
signalsto producers.
While the effectsof import liberalizationare generallybeneficial,aswe haveseen,
theremaybe a costin termsof tax income foregone.In the year 2000,import tariffs
accountedfor 4.8 % of GDp, or 17.9% of governmentincome.12If import tariffsareto
bedrasticallyreduced,then Morocco needsto find other sourcesof tax revenue.The
problemappearsto be manageable,however.Since1988,increasesin the amountofVAT
(ValueAddedTax) collectedon importedgoodsat the country'sbordersseemto have
matchedthereductionin import tariffs,thankslarge1yto increasedinternationaltrade.13
Problemsofeconomientegration
Thephasingout of import tariffsis not the only measurethatwill helpMorocco impro-
veitseconomicperformance.The countryisalsoadoptingalargepartof theEU acquis
communautaire14in fieldssuchasintellectualproperty,competitionpolicyandgovern-
mentsubsidies.This will imposea temporary,but neverthe1essheavy,administrativebur-
den.However,it will alsomakefor a more efficienteconomy,in which clearmIesare
observed.It will, furthermore,reducethe risk of Morocco becominginvolvedin trade
disputeswith other countriesasaresultof 'unfair'tradepractices.Even with thesemea-
lOWTO (2003).
11Söderling(2005).
12IMF (2003)18.
13Bergh(2005)8 nt.17.
14The bodyof EU legislationandregulations.
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sures,however,the risk of suchdisputescannotbe completelyexcluded.Aside tromits
treetradeagreementwith the EU, Morocco hasenteredinto a similaragreementwith
EFTA, theEuropeanFreeTradeAssociation,which is madeup of Iceland,Liechtenstein,
Norway andSwitzerland.Thecountryopenedotheravenuesto treetradein 2004,when
it signedtheAgadirAgreementtogetherwith Jordan,Tunisia andEgypt. In thatsame
year,Morocco alsoconcludedbilateraltree-tradeagreementswith Turkey andwiththe
United States.The latterdeal,which is to be implementedin the period trom2006to
2021,is particularlylikely to resultin all kinds of complications.
Consider the following case.Under their bilateraltree-tradeagreement,Morocco
imports certaingoodstrom the US, treeof duty.However,thesesameAmericangoods
aresubjectto an import tariff when they enterthe EU In this situation,traderswould
be temptedto import the goodsinto Morocco treeof duty,andthen to re-exportthem
to theEU Thisphenomenonisreferredtoasdiflectionif trade,andsuchimportsarenot
welcomedby the EU The EU thereforerequirescertificatesif origin,statingthatatleast
someminimum percentageof the addedvalueof the goodsin questionoriginates&om.
Morocco. The US naturallyoperatesa similar scheme.Aside trom being extremely
expensivein termsof the administrativeburdensthattheyimpose,thesemeasuresopen
the way to cormption and may also sour relationswith trade partners.Peoplewill
alwaystry to cheat.iSIn fact,the mIesof origin includedin thevarioustreetradeagree-
mentsconcludedby Morocco areverydiverse.This is not helpedby the complexstruc-
ture of import tariffs.The World Bank andthe IMF haveput pressureon theMoroccan
governmentto harmonizeandsimplifYthe system.16
There is one bright spot,however.The EU wants to stimulatetradebetweenthe
Mediterraneancountriesandto counteractthe hub-and-spokeeffectsthathavecharac-
terizedtradeeversinceFrenchcolonial rule.17It thereforeallowswhat is referredtoas
the cumulationof certiflcatesof origin.This meansthatthe minimum requirementsper-
tainingto the sourcesof addedvalueincludevalueaddedin otherMediterraneanCOUll-
tries,a rule which appliesto theAgadirAgreement,for instance.While thisis undoub-
tedlya stepin the right direction,in itselfit is not sufiicientto bring aboutanintensi-
flcation of tradebetweenthe Mediterraneancountries.Morocco and its neighbours
could do muchmorein thisrespect.In theyear2000,four neighbouringcountriespro-
videdno morethan2.5%ofMorocco's importsandtook ameasly1.9%ofits exports.18
More regionalliberalizationand integrationwould createopportunitiesto exploithe
economiesof scale.Such stepswould alsomakethe region more attractivefor direct
foreigninvestment,which would help to introducebettertechnology,managementand
marketing.Betweenthem,thethreeMaghrebcountriesofAlgeria,TunesiaandMorocco
15 More on theproblemsassociatedwith fiee-tradeareasandthepointsof differencewith
customsunionsinVisser(2004).
16 L'économiste(13December2005),IMF (2005a)15.
17This refersto thefactthattherehasbeenverylitdetradebetweentheMaghrebcountries;
mosttradehasbeenwith France,which is seenhereasthecentreor hub.
18WTO (2003)22.
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havemorethan75 million inhabitants.The importanceof this fact is thatthereis solid
evidencethatlargerregionaleconomicareastend to attractmore directforeigninvest-
ment.19
Cooperationbeweenthe Maghreb countrieswasslow to takeoff, but it seemsto be
gatheringpaceatlast.A conferenceon tradefacilitationin Algeria,Morocco, andTunisia
washeldin Algiers on November21-22,2005.Those attendinginduded ministers,the
presidentsof various centralbanks,and the managingdirector of the IME Working
groupsweresetup to formulateproposalson issuesrelatingto doser regionaleconom-
ic cooperation.One suchissueconcernsthe harmonizationof traderegulationslinked
totheimplementationof ITeetradeagreements,with particularreferenceto procedures
andrulesof origin. Other issuesare the modernizationof adrninistrativeprocedures
withinthe custornsservice,the streamliningof documentprocessing,the improvement
ofcross-borderpaymentsystems,anda reviewoflogistical chains,induding transporta-
tion.Dateshavebeenfixedfor follow-up meetingsandthereseemsto be a fair chance
thattherespectivegovernmentswill keepup the momentum,perhapswith someprod-
dingttomthe IMF andtheWorld Bank.
Whatcanbeexpectedfiom tradeliberalization?
Full-scalemodelestimatesof the benefi.tsof economicassociationwith the EU arefew
andfarbetween.An ideaof the quantitiesinvolvedcanbe gleanedttom aWorld Bank
studyofTunisia,which is alsoinvolvedin theBarcelonaProcess.20The staticreallocation
effectsof associationwith the EU wereestimatedto permanentlyincreaseGDP by 1.7
percent.Theseeffectsderivettomthereallocationof economicresourcesto bring them
moreinto line with the country'scomparativeadvantage.In addition,therearedynamic
effects,resultingttom economiesof scaleandttomthe effectsofharmonizing healthand
technicalregulationsthatwere forced upon Tunisia by the EuropeanUnion. Another
factoris the increasedtradingefficiencybroughtaboutby improvedfinancial,telecom-
municationandtransportfacilities,which wereupgradedwith EU assistance.The gains
forMorocco arelikely to be of thesameorderof magnitude,with the staticgainsin one
studyestimatedto be in the rangeof 1.5 - 2 per cent.21It shouldbe noted that the
effectsmayturn out to be much largerin reality.This is becausetheWorld Bank study
didnot addressthe effectsof increasedcompetitionttom abroad,suchasthe adoption
of bestpractices,improvedtechnologies,and bettermarketingtechniquesITom other
countries.
It will taketimeto reallocateresourcesbetweenthevariousbranchesofindustry.Nor
canit beassumedthatthisprocesswill be entirelycost-ttee,in termsof ttictionalunem-
ployment.Rutherford etal. expectedthatit would takea fuil fiveyearsbeforeanysta-
ticreallocationeffectsbecomevisible.22Whenlabourandcapitalhaveto moveITomone
19Jaumotte(2004).
20Rutherfordetal. (1995).
21Rutherfordetal. (1993).
22Rurherfordetal. (1993).
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industry to another,the expansionof new industriesmay very weIl lag behindthe
contractionof old ones.Firstly,businessmenhaveto exploit new opportunitiescreated
by tradeliberalizationand secondly,part of the labour force will haveto be retrained.
Rutherford etal.estimatedthatthe costof suchretrainingwasroughlyequivalentoone
year'ssalary.
The reallocationof labour rnaybe especiallydifficult in poor agriculturaldistricts.
Vnder the fiee tradeagreementwith the Vnited States,import tariffson cereals,which
run at up to 100per cent,areto be phasedout. It hasto be saidthat cerealproduction
in Morocco is not very efficient.It takesup scarceresources,water in particular,that
would givehigheryieldsif channeIledinto theproductionof othergoods.Nevertheless,
theWorld Bank hasexpressedconcernthatduty-fieeimportsof cerealsfiom theUnited
Stateswill only serveto exacerbaterural poverty.The Moroccan governmenthasbeen
singularlyslow in preparingsupportmeasuresfor thoseaffected.23
Thesecostsmustbebalancedagainsthe additionalbenefitsthatcanbe expectedtrom
tradeliberalization,overandabovethe efficiencygainsfiom productionwhich exploits
the country'scomparativeadvantage.Thesebenefitsaccruefiom thepossiblereduction
of'rent-seekingactivities',which would fiee up resourcesfor moreproductiveactivities.
What are'rent-seekingactivities'?In a systemof regulatedtrade,politiciansandcivilser-
vantshavediscretionarypower over the grantingof import permitsand tariffexemp-
tions.Import licensesand exemptionsareimportantsourcesof income.Import restric-
tionsreducethe supplyof goods,which meansthathigherpricescanbe charged.If the
reductionof supplyis brought aboutby a licensingsystemratherthan import duties,
therewill be a largegapbetweenthe pricespaid by importersandthe pricestheycau
chargeon the domesticmarket.They will receivea much higherprice thanis required
for themto stayin the market,in other words,they earn a 'rent'.The sameappliesto
exemptionsfiom import duties,of course.Licensesand exemptionshavea monetary
value,soimporterswill devotetimeandotherresourcestrying to securethem.Fromthe
point of view of societyasa whole,such'rent-seekingactivities'areextremelywasteful.
Moreover,theyeasilyresultin shadydealings.Politiciansandcivil servantsgrantpermits
and exemptions,thenpocket a shareof the 'rents'createdby the import restrietionsas
payment.Even if theycanwithstandthetemptationto acceptabribe, theircontroIover
import restrictionsgivesthem considerablepower.Such power is seldomusedto allo-
catelicensesin anequitableandefficientway.There tendsto be a coterieof politicians,
civil servantsand leading traders, to which small businessmenhave no access.
Furthermore,the whole systemis detrimentalto efficiency.Entrepreneursarecompel-
led to diverttime andenergyinto maintaininggood contactswith the statebureaucra-
cy,to the detrimentof innovativeactivity.
23 L'économiste(25January2005).
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Additionalrequirementsfor success
Internationaltradetheoryis unclearaboutwhethertradeshouldbe seen asanengineof
growthor asnothingmore than its handmaiden.24Perhapsthis questionwill neverbe
satisfactorilyanswered.This is because,in the peculiarlyun-erotic universeof themeta-
phorsthatmakeup a largepart of economictheory,it is difficult to distinguish'hand-
maidens'from'engines'.But evenassumingthattradeis anengine,it would only run in
fitsandstartsunlessa numberof conditionsarefulfilled.
Firstofall,while Morocco hasconcludedvariousfreetradeagreements,thisdoesnot
necessarilymeanthattradeis genuinelyttee.Tradein manufacturedgoodswith theEU
mayindeedleavelessroom for the restrictionsthatcreate'rents'.Nevertheless,thereare
stillplentyofopportunitiesto irnposesuchrestrictionsin tradewith othercountries,and
inagriculturaltrade.Not only doesthis hinder trade,it alsoimpedesthe development
ofindustriesthatareableto competeon world markets.
Furthermore,tradeliberalizationmustbe accompaniedby similarliberalizationon the
domesticfront,to bring aboutanefficientallocationof resources.More importantlystill,
thiswill allow talentedindividualsto give fu1lrein to their entrepreneurialabilities.
Domesticliberalizationincludesa reductionof the costsof doing business,mainlyby
doingawaywith red tape.It mayalsoincludethe privatizationof governmententerpri-
ses.Unfortunately,this doesnot alwayshelp to createthe sort of competitiveenviron-
mentinwhichentrepreneursareconstantlyintroducinginnovations:new products,new
productionmethods,new markets,new sourcesof supplyof raw materialsor semi-finis-
hedgoods,or there-structuringof anindustry.SuchSchumpeterian'new combinations'
aressentialto ongoingeconomicdevelopment.25It is all too easy,andunfortunatelyall
tooconnnon,for governmentsto sellassetscheaplyto favouredbuyers.During thelate
1980s,somethirty largefamilieswith closetiesto the royalpalacein Morocco seemto
haveprofitedin thisway.26This favoursthedevelopmentof oligopolies,in whichindi-
vidualfirmsareleft in peacein their cosycorner of the market.They havelittle incen-
tivetoinnovateandcreatenewjobs.Therearesigns,however,thattheprivatizationthat
'hastakenplacein recentyearshasbeen more successful.In addition,foreign investors
aretakingup a largeproportion of the assetsput up for sale.27
~Furthermore,thereis the questionof education.According toWorld Bank figures,in
2002illiteracyratesin individualsabovethe age of 14 were 37% for malesand 62%
arnongfemales.28Moreover,theemphasisonArabic,coupledwith aneglectof French
andotherforeignlanguages,meansthateducationis not well gearedto the needsof a
developingeconomy.Nor doesit helpthatthereareno lessthanfour differentministries
ofeducation.
24Linnemann(1996).
25Schumpeter(1969)66.
26Bergh(2005)9.
27Bergh(2005)9 nt.21.
28www.worldbank.org->Morocco->dataprofile
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There are other requirementsfor fastereconomic developmentand job creation;
whichwecanonlymentionin passinghere.Oneisasophisticatedfinancialsystemthat
is subjectto clearmIesandefllcientsupervision.Afurthercausefor concernisthelirni-
tedavailabilityandhighcostofcreditforsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.29An effi-
cient, low-cost transportinttastructureis also essentialfor economic growth,yetthe
chargesleviedfor the useof Moroccan ports areoutrageouslyhigh.30Things arelikely
to improve,however,asthe Tanger-Med (Tanger-Méditerranée)port complex,whieh.
wiil be accessibleto shipscarryingup to 2000containers,is nearingcompletion.
Final observations
There is every reason to believe that Morocco will benefit ttom the Association
Agreement,but not to thefuil extentpossible.The EU shouldliberalizeimportsofagri-
culturalproductsand,for its part,Morocco could do more to stimulatetradewithits
neighbours. Furthermore, the country can only fuUy profit ttom liberalizationif
domesticmarketsarealsoopenedup,and if entrepreneursarenot hinderedby excessi-
ve red tape.In addition,educationallevelsaretoo low for Morocco to profit fullyfiom
the opportunitiesprovidedby more openness.While the liberalizationof tradehelpsto
fight poverty,it is by no meansapanacea.This is a vital firststep,nothing more.
When comparedto developingcountriesasa whole (seeTable2) andto itsneighbour
Tunisiain particular,Morocco's economicgrowth to datehasbeenquitelack-lustre.31
Table2. GDP Growth,1971-2004 (inpercent)
Souree:Morocco:SelectedIssues,IMF CountryReportNo.05/419,p.6;basedonMoroaan
NationalAccounts;MlEO database;andIMF Stqffestimates.Thegroupofdevelopingcountries
encompasses152nations.
29 IMP (2005a)16.
30L'économiste(13December2005).Poramorecomprehensivereviewofrecent
developmentssee10YearsofBarce/onaprocess(2005).
31 IMP (2005b)6.
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RealGDP growth RealGDP per-capitagrowth
Morocco Developing Morocco Developing
countries countries
1971-2004 3.81 4.47 1.75 2.58
1971-1982 4.75 0.74 0.09 2.58
1982-1991 4.32 3.75 2.16 1.80
1991-1998 2.11 4.20 0.42 2.51
1998-2004 3.33 5.35 2.05 3.84
Althoughbadlyaffectedbyaseriesof droughtsin the1990s,growthhasnowpickedup
again.It isdifficultto sayhow much of the increasein growth is due to the impactof
theAssociationAgreementwith the EU. However,econometricstudieshaverevealeda
positiver lationshipbetweenMorocco's increasedopennessin tradeand its economic
growth.32Theofficialunemploymentfigureshavedroppedsteadilyfiom 14.5per cent
in1999to anestimated10.8per centin 2004.However,the latterfigure disguisesthe
factthaturbanunemploymentstoodat 18.4per centin 2004.33There is still a long way
togoandonecanonly hope thatthe groundwork for sustainedgrowth hasbeenlaid.
32IMF (200Sb)27.Tradeopennessis theratioof thisvolumeof trade(rea!exportsplusimports)
overGDp,adjustedfor thesize(areaandpopulation)of thecountry,per capitaGDp,whetherit
islandlocked,andwhetherit is an oil exporter.
33IMF (200Sb)62.
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